In the previous article, I referred to the implications and importance of international partnerships for the security of the Gulf region. However, it must be considered that these partnerships are a product of policies and trends established by Western elites, as seen in the case of Republicans and Democrats in the United States, or the political currents in Europe ranging from the far left to the far right, including the centrist stream. This is also true for the exchange of power between the Labour Party and the Conservatives in Britain. As with other researchers in international relations interested in changes among these elites, I follow the outcomes of the elections that coincide with the emergence of new elites.

While it is true that there are strategic interests for these countries towards the Gulf region, grounded in a long history of relationships and events and crises where these countries played a prominent role—starting with the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, passing through the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, and culminating in the American invasion of Iraq in 2003—there have also been statements from these elites that confirm, without a shadow of a doubt, the uniqueness and importance of the Gulf region for global security. This means that there will not be dramatic changes in the policies of these countries and organizations towards the region, even with the changing political elites in power. This is generally true, but we must also consider the tactics of these policies, even if they do not witness changes in their essence. Each party has principles and mechanisms to implement those principles.

In a brief overview, American foreign policies are generally based on achieving a balance between interests and values, with one of the pillars being more evident in connection with the nature of the ruling party. This was exemplified during the tenures of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The same applies to the Labour and Conservative parties; one cannot predict the contents of those policies towards the Middle East and the Gulf region. However, in my opinion, they relate to two factors: the first is the foreign priorities for Britain concerning the economic challenges it faces, and the second is the British coordination with the United States regarding the Middle East, as well as its priorities, given that this region is not the only one on the American administration’s agenda. There are issues like the Ukraine war and the Chinese challenge in areas where the United States has vital interests, including the Gulf region, leading up to the EU’s collective policies regarding the rise of the far right within the EU institutions and the extent of that influence on the Union’s policies.

It should be noted that the period leading up to those elections saw important developments, including the launch of the EU’s partnership strategy with Gulf countries, which has begun to bear fruit through the extension of entry visa periods for citizens of some Gulf states to Europe for five years, with Gulf countries aspiring for more, including a definitive exemption from those visas, similar to what some other countries, including Russia, have done.

While it is essential for Gulf countries and especially researchers to pay attention to the course of these changes in major countries, we must not overlook three facts. First: there are national security strategies for these countries issued every few years, some of which may extend to the term of the new president. These strategies result from working groups comprising civilians and military personnel over several years, where priorities are defined concerning these countries and must be executed by the new president. Additionally, organizations such as NATO issued their eighth strategic concept in May 2022, which included that the priority for the alliance is combating terrorism in the Sahel countries, leaving little room for prolonged discussion about regional issues, including maritime security threats, for example. Furthermore, a close examination of the American national security strategy released in the same year reveals a brief section about the United States’ intention to support the Gulf Cooperation Council, although it is not the priority goal in the Middle East.

The second fact: major countries’ reluctance to engage in direct military involvement in crises as in the past, except when the situation necessitates it due to perceived violations of what they see as “red lines,” as deemed by those elites. The third and final fact is that despite the competition among those powers in their foreign policies, it is less pronounced regarding the Gulf region for several reasons. One of which is that European countries have overlapping memberships between the EU and NATO, making it sometimes challenging to talk about the EU and NATO as separate organizations, not to mention the traditional competition among European countries themselves concerning the Gulf region.

While the research efforts and academic opinions that focus on the elections in Europe, Britain, and the United States are of great importance—whether those outcomes have been finalized or are still pending—those efforts should go beyond mere predictions to identify the needs of the region from those new elites, away from just emphasizing the importance of partnerships. The region is currently experiencing instability amid the war in Gaza; even the Ukrainian war has ramifications, especially concerning the energy sector. Therefore, the academic vision of the upcoming Western elites should stem from three determinants: first, there is a need for tangible efforts to defuse the state of regional instability, notably the impact of escalating regional conflicts on Western countries’ interests, ranging from attacks on oil facilities to threats against maritime transport routes, leading to the closure of oil production fields.

Note: This article has been automatically translated.

Source: Akhbar Al Khaleej